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THE LIMITS OF SELF-AWARENESS
The disjunctive theory of perception claims that we should under-
stand statements about how things appear to a perceiver to be
equivalent to statements of a disjunction that either one is perceiving
such and such or one is suffering an illusion (or hallucination); and
that such statements are not to be viewed as introducing a report of
a distinctive mental event or state common to these various disjoint
situations.
When Michael Hinton first introduced the idea, he suggested that
the burden of proof or disproof lay with his opponent, that what was
needed was to show that our talk of how things look or appear to one
to be introduces more than what he later came to call perception-
illusion disjunctions:
I do not at present see how it can be, or could be, shown that there is such a thing
as (Q) [a statement which reports the occurrence of a visual experience in contrast
to expressing a perception-illusion disjunction]. Consequently I do not see how it
can be shown that there is such a thing as my psi-ing for these and other statements
to be about; and since one surely should not make statements without being able
to show that they are about something, this means that as far as I can see no such
statements should be made. Perhaps I just can’t see far enough, but I should like
to be shown that this is so. (Hinton, 1967, p. 220)
I suspect that many readers on encountering either Hinton’s presen-
tation of disjunctivism or the accounts of it available from
Snowdon or McDowell, would find surprising this demand that
the burden of proof for the existence of a non-disjunctive sensory
experience. Surely we know what a sensory experience is in just
the sense that Hinton is denying. What we don’t know, the line of
the thought may go, is quite what the disjunctivist is saying in its
place. Doesn’t the burden of proof lie, then, with the disjunctive
theory of appearances: first to clarify further what it has to say,
and then to offer some appropriate defence of these outlandish
claims?
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The aim of this paper is to offer some of that elaboration, but
also in turn to explain the way in which Hinton was correct in his
challenge. Properly understood, the disjunctive approach to percep-
tion is the appropriate starting point for any discussion of the nature
of perceptual experience. The key to the approach is not in its appeal
to paraphrasing claims about experience in disjunctive form, but is
rather in an appeal to the idea of indiscriminability in explicating
the claims we accept about experience. The core thought is that
we grasp the idea of sense experience as such, in contrast to sense
perception, through recognising that there are things that we cannot
know about ourselves just through reflection on the situation we
find ourselves in. As I aim to explain below, a suitable modesty
about what one can know about one’s experiential state is the proper
starting point for theorising about sense experience in general. Any
theory which moves beyond such modesty and makes substantive
claims about the properties that sense experiences possess needs to
justify this boldness.
In what follows, there are two morals that I wish to draw. The
first concerns the question of the conception of sense experience
in general; the second concerns the claims that the disjunctivist
is committed to concerning a special sub-class of hallucinations,
those brought about through the same proximate causal conditions
as veridical perceptions. It is in relation to the latter that the
most striking (and many will find most implausible) claim that
the disjunctivist makes, that there may be sensory states whose
mental nature is characterisable in nothing but epistemological
terms, in terms of their unknowable difference from cases of
veridical perception. But the significance of this commitment can
be understood only in the light of the former claim about experience
in general. Before addressing those matters, I want briefly to raise
two others: the prime motivation for endorsing disjunctivism,
and the question of how we are to understand its formulations as
provided by Hinton, Snowdon and McDowell.
1. The prime reason for endorsing disjunctivism is to block the
rejection of a view of perception I’ll label Naïve Realism. The
Naïve Realist thinks that some at least of our sensory episodes are
presentations of an experience-independent reality. When I sit here
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writing this, I am conscious of the various elements that make up a
North London street scene. The same objects and aspects of these
objects which I can attend to as part of the environment beyond me
are also aspects of what I can attend to when I pursue the question,
‘What is it like for me now so be staring out of the window rather
than writing my paper?’ Mind-independent reality can form the
subject-matter of sensuous experience. In affirming this the Naïve
Realist finds common ground with those views of perception which
attribute to it a representational or intentional content and seek to
explain its phenomenal character in terms of that content – Inten-
tional Theories of Perception. For it is common to support such
theories by pointing out that our sense experience is transparent –
that experientially we are presented with a mind-independent realm
and not simply some array of mind-dependent qualities or entities
whose existence depends on this awareness.1
The Naïve Realist, however, claims that our sense experience
of the world is, at least in part, non-representational. Some of the
objects of perception – the concrete individuals, their properties,
the events these partake in – are constituents of the experience.
No experience like this, no experience of fundamentally the same
kind, could have occurred had no appropriate candidate for aware-
ness existed. In this, sense perception contrasts with imagining and
thought. For one can certainly imagine objects in their absence, so
the mind’s direction on an object does not require that it actually
exist when one imagines. The same is true, arguably, of thought –
we think of objects which in fact do not exist as well thinking of the
existent. The Naïve Realist insists that sensing is not like this, and in
that respect the Naïve Realist finds common ground with the Sense-
Datum tradition, or what more broadly I will label Subjectivism. For
Subjectivists have long insisted that what is distinctive of sensing as
opposed to thinking is that one really cannot sense in the absence of
an object of sensing.2
Whatever its other merits, Naïve Realism is inconsistent with
two assumptions which are common to much of the philosophical
discussion of perception. The first of these is Experiential Natural-
ism: our sense experiences, like other events or states within the
natural world, are subject to the causal order, and in this case are
thereby subject just to broadly physical causes (i.e. including neuro-
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physiological causes and conditions) and psychological causes (if
these are disjoint from physical causes). One can manipulate the
world so as to induce an hallucination in someone, for example, by
suitable stimulation of their sensory cortices and possible manipula-
tion of their psychological condition. One does not, in addition, have
to invoke any further influence over other super-luminary entities,
something neither physical nor mental, in order to bring about the
experience. The second assumption is The Common Kind Assump-
tion: whatever kind of mental event occurs when one is veridically
perceiving some scene, such as the street scene outside my window,
that kind of event can occur whether or not one is perceiving. One
may hold to this assumption for different reasons – it is tempting to
suppose that it is obvious just because by ‘sensory experience’ we
mean to pick out that event for which there is something it is like
for the subject when they perceive or hallucinate, or whatever. And
we are, of course, aware that from the subject’s point of view there
may seem to be no difference at all between a case of hallucination
and one of perception. So the event in question must be of the same
phenomenal kind as the kind of veridical perception it matches. One
may also eschew phenomenological evidence for the commitment in
favour of an appeal to causal considerations – that reflection on how
we can bring about perceptions and hallucinations should lead us to
suppose that the immediate effects of appropriate brain stimulation,
the experiences caused, must be the same whether or not a percep-
tion or an hallucination is brought about. Either way, the assumption
is that when we are thinking of the mental or subjective aspect of
perception we pick out a kind of event or state which is common to
cases of perception and hallucination.
Naïve Realism together with these two assumptions leads to
contradiction. For first, assume that we have some event which is
as the Naïve Realist supposes a perception can be: it is an awareness
of some lavender bush which exists independent of one’s current
awareness of it. By the Common Kind Assumption, whatever kind
of experience that is, just such an experience could have occurred
were one merely hallucinating. By Experiential Naturalism, we
know that there are sufficient appropriate physical and psycho-
logical causes of it. If the hallucinatory experience were relational
in the manner that the Naïve Realist supposes the perception of the
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bush to be, then the causes sufficient to bring about the hallucina-
tion must also have been sufficient for some appropriate object to
be present in the experience. By our assumption about the causes,
this is done without assuming any extra causal correlations between
the causes of the experience and any non-physical object of aware-
ness. Hence the bringing about of the experience must have been
sufficient for the existence of its object – that is, the experience is
of a kind sufficient for the existence of its object. If the experience
alone is constitutively sufficient for this object of awareness in the
case of hallucination, then the object in this case is not merely non-
physical but dependent for its existence on the occurrence of this
experience.3,4
Since the experience which occurs when one is hallucinating
is of just the sort that occurs when one is veridically perceiving,
the experience one has when one is veridically perceiving is by
itself sufficient to constitute the existence of its object of aware-
ness. According to the Naïve Realist, the object of awareness is
experience-independent, yet in this case we are to suppose that there
is in addition an experience-dependent object sufficient to account
for the nature of the experience. So, contrary to the Naïve Realist’s
starting assumption, if the hallucinatory experience is a relation to
an object of awareness, it is to a mind-dependent one, and hence
the perception is a relation to a mind-dependent object, not the
mind-independent object that the Naïve Realist hypothesises.
What if one assumes instead that the hallucinatory experience is
not the awareness of anything at all? From the subject’s perspective
it may seem as if there is a table there before him or her, but in
reality there is nothing for them to be standing in such a relation
of awareness. We have to describe the situation as if there is such
an object – we say that the subject ‘sees’ a bush, or it is ‘as if’
there is an apparent bush. In doing so, though, we do not really
indicate any acceptance of ontological commitment; rather we treat
the experience rather as having an ‘intentional object’.5 To make this
move is to assume that the experience of the kind that the subject has
when hallucinating does not need to have any objects of awareness
as constituents of the experience – some experiences we treat as if
they are the presentations of such objects, but they don’t need any
such objects to exist in order for them to occur. This position may
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seem to have the ontological advantage of avoiding any commit-
ment to mind-dependent entities, and for that reason has often been
preferred. But despite this advantage, it offers no respite from the
argument we are now considering. Since the experience in question,
the hallucination, is of just the same kind as the veridical perception,
then the same holds of the veridical perception as of the hallucina-
tion. That is, the veridical perception does not have the objects of
perception as constituents, despite the Naïve Realist’s claims to the
contrary.
So, Experiential Naturalism imposes certain constraints on what
can be true of hallucinatory experiences. Such experiences either
can have only experience-dependent objects, or not be relations
to objects at all. By the Common Kind Assumption, whatever is
true of the kind of experience that one has when one is halluci-
nating, the same must be true of the kind of experience one
has when perceiving. So either one’s experience when veridically
perceiving is of some mind-dependent object, or the experience is
not essentially a relation to any object at all.
Hence, Naïve Realism is inconsistent with these two assump-
tions. One way of reading the history of philosophy of perception is
to see it in terms of a conflict between Naïve Realism and the kind
of commitments reflected in these two assumptions.6 Sense-datum
theories hold on to one aspect of Naïve Realism, that experience is a
relation between the subject and some object of awareness, yet reject
the thought that such objects can be the objects in the world around
us. Intentional theories of perception are often moved by the thought
that one should hold on to the other aspect of Naïve Realism, that
one is related to the world around us through perceptual conscious-
ness, but thereby give up the element of Naïve Realism, that such
awareness is genuinely a relation to such objects.
The motivation for disjunctivism, I suggest, is a desire to hold on
to Naïve Realism. For reasons expanded on elsewhere, I suggest that
we should think of Naïve Realism as the best articulation of how our
experiences strike us as being to introspective reflection on them.7 It
is common to complain against sense-datum theories that they deny
that we have genuine awareness of objects in the world around us,
to complain that they introduce a veil of perception. The best sense
one can make of this complaint is really that sense-datum theories
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are forced to say that the real nature of our sensory experience is
not how it strikes us as being. But if Naïve Realism is the correct
description of how our sensory experience strikes us, then an inten-
tional theory of perception is no less revisionary than a sense-datum
account. To hold on to our Naïve view of experience, though, we
need to reject one of the starting assumptions: either Experiential
Naturalism or the Common Kind Assumption.
Experiential Naturalism was implicitly rejected by the early
sense-datum theorists who were sceptical of the completeness or
unity of the physical world and open to positing the existence of
many strange items.8 Such a rejection may not be a priori incoherent
but it comes at high cost. So too does a rejection of this argu-
ment through embracing transcendental idealism, as Merleau-Ponty
suggests, and as Jerry Valberg more recently has recommended.9
If we do not think of our experience of the world as itself being
a part of the world, then we need not conceive it as having causal
antecedents within the world – we then need not think of how such
events can otherwise be brought about.
The disjunctivist response, however, remains committed to the
broad empirical assumptions and methodological presuppositions
which lead one to endorse Experiential Naturalism and hence the
conclusions drawn from it about the nature of our experiences. It
seeks to resist the rejection of Naïve Realism, therefore, simply
by denying the Common Kind Assumption. That is, we hold on
to Naïve Realism by insisting that the fundamental kind of event
that one’s sensory experience which is a veridical perception of the
table in front of one is a kind of event which just could not occur
were one hallucinating. Even if some matching hallucination would
either have to be an awareness of some mind-dependent object or
of no object at all, nothing follows from that alone about the status
of one’s veridical perception.
2. What does the denial of the Common Kind Assumption amount
to? The three disjunctivists with which I started, Hinton together
with Paul Snowdon and John McDowell, offer significantly different
formulations of the view. Contrast Hinton in the first quotation, with
Snowdon and then McDowell:
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Even if few things are certain, it is certain that there are what I shall call
perception-illusion disjunctions: sentences or statements like ‘Macbeth perceives
a dagger or is having that illusion’, which you can compose by adding words like
‘. . . or x is having that illusion’ to a sentence which says that a particular person,
x, perceives a thing of some particular kind. (Hinton, 1973, p. 37)
It looks to S as if there is an F: (there is something which looks to S to be F) or
(it is to S as if there is something which looks to him (S) to be F). (Snowdon,
1980–1981)
. . . an appearance that such-and-such is the case can be either a mere appearance
or the fact made manifest to someone . . . the object of experience in the deceptive
cases is a mere appearance. But we are not to accept that in the non-deceptive
cases too the object of experience is a mere appearance, and hence something that
falls short of the fact itself . . . appearances are no longer conceived as intervening
between the experiencing subject and the world. (McDowell, 1982)
In each case the disjunctive form is specified in significantly
different ways. Hinton and Snowdon focus on locutions of object
perception, ‘S sees o’, which are commonly taken to be transparent
in the object position. Hinton contrasts on either side of his disjunc-
tion the seeing of a flash of light with the having of an illusion of a
flash of light. Snowdon, in contrast, treats both veridical perception
and illusion as belonging on the privileged side of the disjunction,
since both involve perception of an object, and keeps only hallucina-
tion to the contrasted side. In contrast to both of these, McDowell is
interested in locutions of factual perception: ‘S sees/can see that p’.
Such locutions are typically opaque in the complement clause, and
the relation between talk of object perception and fact perception
is complex – not every object mentioned in a perceived fact need
be an object of perception; even if some fact must be perceived
concerning any object of perception, it is not clear that there is
any specific fact which must have been perceived in perceiving an
object. McDowell’s contrast case, then, is simply that of merely
apprehending the appearance of p, rather than properly grasping the
fact.10
Perhaps, then, rather than speaking in terms of the disjunctive
theory of appearances, we should recognise a cluster of approaches,
all of which have in common just a negative thesis: the thesis
that we should not think that perceptual experience is to be
analysed as a common factor of perception and either illusion or
hallucination.
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However, if we characterise the approach just in this negative
way, then we are also liable to be misled. For this seems to offer
merely an incomplete sketch of an account which needs further
supplementation. First, one needs some further gloss of the ‘privi-
leged’ disjunct – the reference to perception or veridical perception.
That there is some idea at the back of these theories is often
implicitly understood when one reads them – these account are
supposed, somehow or other, to defend some form of direct realism.
On the other hand, the negative construal as yet does not tell us
what to say about the ‘underprivileged’ disjunct, the one that fails
the condition to be counted as perception. Surely we need to know
what more to say about these cases before we know what these
approaches are telling us about perceptual experience in general.
Jonathan Dancy offers a clear expression of this line of thought
when he suggests:
The disjunctive account of perception really says that there are two quite different
sorts of oasis-experience, which may none the less be indistinguishable to their
owner. The first is the genuine article, and the second, though it is indistinguish-
able, has nothing in common with the first other than the fact that they are both
oasis-experiences. In the standard formulation of the account, misleadingly, this
is explicitly the way in which the second disjunct is characterized: we charac-
terize it solely by saying that it is like what it is not. Presumably, however, there
may be available a more direct characterization of the second disjunct, and in a
totally explicit version of the theory it would indeed be characterized in that better
way. The current characterization is just the sort of place-holder, showing what
has to be said about the relation between the first and second disjunct. (Dancy,
1995)
Yet if we take Dancy’s concerns seriously and attempt to spell
disjunctivism out in more detail, we encounter two further prob-
lems. According to Dancy, in the proper dress of the theory, we
should surmise that the full account of perceptual experience offers a
clause for the privileged case of perception and the underprivileged
case of illusion or hallucination. Where other theories can hope
to offer a common explanation of the phenomena that we look to
perception and sensory experience to provide, the supplemented
disjunctivism will need to offer two distinct accounts. As such the
approach necessarily lacks the consilience of conjunctive accounts
of sensory experience. Struck by this obvious thought, it is no
surprise that opponents are liable to think that justification needs
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to be provided for the disjunctivist position rather than vice versa –
Hinton’s attitude is liable to seem mere complacence.
Behind this lies a deeper worry. Is there really a coherent supple-
mentation to the disjunctive account? Suppose we do get a further
specification of the kind of mental event that occurs in the non-
privileged circumstances. If what marks these cases out in the first
place is just that they involve the absence of perception, then one
may worry that whatever fixes what they have in common with each
other will apply equally to any case of perception. That is to say,
the further specification of hallucination will be something which
is present not only in all cases of illusion or hallucination but also
in the case of perception. The disjunctivist will then be left in the
unhappy position of conceding that there is a common element to all
of the cases, while still insisting that there is something distinctive
of perception. Now if the common element is sufficient to explain
all the relevant phenomena in the various cases of illusion and
hallucination, one may also worry that it must be sufficient in the
case of perception as well. In that case, disjunctivism is threatened
with viewing its favoured conception of perception as explanatorily
redundant.
In what follows I will address both of these concerns. Hinton is
right to say that the disjunctivist conception of perceptual experi-
ence in general should in fact be our default conception. And Dancy
is wrong to think that the disjunctivist specification is incomplete,
that we should supplement the account of experience with a non-
relational gloss of what illusory or hallucinatory experiences are.
Nonetheless, the remaining worry about explanatory redundancy
does pose a serious challenge to disjunctivism, as we shall see,
and in the end addressing this challenge brings out the most
distinctive and surprising aspect of disjunctivism: the limits to the
self-awareness we can have of our own sensory states.
Properly understood, disjunctivism offers us an epistemological
perspective on how we should conceive the debate about sensory
experience. It helps bring out how weighty one’s epistemological
assumptions about the mind must be, if one is to advance beyond
this epistemological stance.
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3. How then should we think about sense experience? What gives us
a grip on the notion? Contrast two different ways of thinking about
the Cartesian story of lucid dreaming. Few of us have any problem
grasping the idea of perfect hallucinations. At present, I have good
reason to suppose that I am seeing a London street pretty much as it
is. So I have a veridical perception of the unkempt lavender bush at
the end of my road that marks the advance of late summer. Nonethe-
less, as far as I can tell, it seems a genuine possibility that I could
have been in a situation which was not one of actually perceiving my
environment for how it was but which I would not have been able to
tell apart from this, my actual situation, just through introspection
and reflection on my experience. Such a case would surely be a
perfect hallucination of the kind of scene that I am perceiving, as
things stand, for what it is.
On the first conception of experience, one that someone who
endorses the Common Kind Assumption might endorse, this starting
point is further elaborated so. A perceptual experience is a kind
of event which has certain distinctive features E1 . . . En. Not only
is the possession of these features necessary and sufficient for an
event to be an experience, but, in addition, an event’s possession
of them is introspectible by the subject of the experience. When I
come to recognise the possibility of perfect hallucination just like
my current perception, what I do is both recognise the presence of
these characteristics, E1 . . . En, in virtue of which this event is such
an experience, and also recognise that an event’s possessing these
characteristics is independent of whether the event is a perception
or not. So in accepting the Cartesian possibility I display a grasp
of a positive piece of knowledge about the nature of certain mental
events.
Note that to accept this much still leaves open what character-
istics E1 . . . En are. For all that has been said we should construe
these as an experience’s being the presentation of such and such
mind-dependent qualities, as a sense-datum theory supposes. Or
we might instead take them to be representational properties, as an
intentional theory would press. For our present purposes here, we
can remain neutral about this matter. All that matters for our current
purposes is that such views will attribute to subjects who grasp the
concept of perfect hallucination both the power to identify the marks
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of experience in having an experience and a recognition of their
modal independence of the conditions of perceiving. To this extent,
then, such theories are immodest in their attribution of epistemo-
logical powers that subjects have when they give an explanation of
how we come to have a conception of sensory experience which can
be employed from the first person perspective.
This is not the only way to elaborate the initial sketch. Instead
one may insist that the original instructions to conceive of perfectly
matching hallucinations are all that is needed to give one a concep-
tion of perceptual experience. This second way of thinking about the
idea of sense experience, we might call a modest or minimal concep-
tion. We need not look for some further characteristics in virtue of
which an event counts as an experience of a street scene, but rather
take something to be such an experience simply in virtue of its being
indiscriminable from a perception of a street scene. Nothing more is
needed for something to be an experience, according to this concep-
tion, than that it satisfy this epistemological condition. Rather than
appealing to a substantive condition which an event must meet to
be an experience, and in addition ascribing to us cognitive powers
to recognise the presence of this substantive condition, it instead
emphasises the limits of our powers of discrimination and the limits
of self-awareness: some event is an experience of a street scene
just in case it couldn’t be told apart through introspection from a
veridical perception of the street as the street.
Does this second conception really capture what we need? Well
a proponent of the immodest view cannot fault a modest account for
failing to capture in its conception of what a sense experience is all
those situations that the immodest account deems to be perceptual
experiences of a street scene. After all, by immodest lights the kind
of experience one has when seeing such a street scene is of just the
same kind as any non-perceptual event which is not a perception
but still an experience as of a street scene, namely an event with
the properties E1 . . . En. Since nothing can be discriminated from
itself, the immodest approach will hold that the modest one should
agree that these events are indiscriminable from a veridical percep-
tion of a street scene and hence are perceptual experiences as of a
street scene. (Of course, by modest lights this consequence might
not follow, but that would only be because the particular version of
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the immodest account is inadequate and the properties E1 . . . En it
specifies are not after all sufficient for an event’s being a perceptual
experience as of a street scene even in the case of veridical percep-
tion.) So immodest views may complain that modest ones fail to
capture what defines an event’s being an experience but not that their
conception of experience is too narrow.
On the other hand, it is difficult for an immodest account to avoid
complaining that modest ones are far too catholic in their conception
of what can be an experience as of a street scene. Given all we have
said so far, nothing rules out as possible a situation in which E1 . . .
En are absent but in which a subject would be unable to discriminate
through reflection this situation from one in which a street scene was
really being seen. For the immodest view in question, this could not
be a case of visual experience as of a street scene, while by modest
lights that would be exactly what it is.
Now surely this result would be unfortunate for any immodest
view, given our initial assumptions. For we supposed that reflection
on experience offers support to a Naïve realist construal of sensory
experience. When one reflects on one’s experience it seems to one
as if one is thereby presented with some experience-independent
elements of the scene before one as constituents of one’s experience
and not merely as represented to one as in imagination. Even if the
experience does also possess the characteristics E1 . . . En, it need not
manifest to the perceiver that these are present as opposed to Naïve
realist aspects of experience. And it is at least not manifest that the
experience is the kind of experience it is in virtue of the presence
of these properties as opposed to being Naïve realist – for were it,
then clearly it would not even seem to us as if Naïve realism is true.
When we turn to a case of perfect hallucination, we know that the
Naïve phenomenal properties which seem to be present in the case
of veridical perception certainly cannot be present in the case of
hallucination. Of course they may still seem to be present, and in as
much as the hallucination is indistinguishable from the perception
they will seem to be so. So, if the presence of E1 . . . En as opposed
to the presence of Naïve phenomenal properties is not manifest
to us in the case of veridical perception, and anyway is certainly
not presented as definitive of that’s being the experience it is, then
it seems plausible that what links the case of hallucination to the
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veridical perception is the seeming presence of Naïve phenomenal
properties and not E1 . . . En. In that case, common sense has no
reason to discriminate against a case of perfect hallucination which
lacks E1 . . . En but yet which seems to possess the properties
relevant to its being an experience as of a street scene in the first
place, the seeming presence of Naïve phenomenal properties.
If a modest account is too catholic in its conception of experi-
ence, immodest views will seem from a common sense perspective
to be too restrictive. Even if the presence of E1 . . . En is sufficient
to determine that one is having an experience as of a street scene,
nothing has shown why it has to be necessary. Rather, if it really is
possible to produce an experience lacking those features but other-
wise being indiscriminable from a perception of a street scene, the
account will offer just one way in which such an experience can
occur. A proponent of an immodest view can only hope to offer
necessary as well as sufficient conditions for having an experience
– and hence to explain the having of experience in terms of its
favoured conditions – if it can ensure that the modest approach and
its favoured form of immodesty coincide in the extension they give
the concept of experience.
In turn, this coincidence of extension can be guaranteed only
if the proponent of the immodest account embraces a substantive
epistemic principle. That will be achieved only if the situation
sketched above turns out to be impossible: that there cannot be
any situation which is indistinguishable for its subject from actually
perceiving a street scene and yet which lacks the relevant proper-
ties. In turn, one must assume that a subject couldn’t but be in a
position to discriminate a situation which lacked E1 . . . En from one
which possessed them. Here I just assume that for one situation to
be indiscriminable from another requires only that it not be possible
to know that it is distinct in kind.11 Therefore to deny it is possible
that a situation which is distinct in kind from an event possessing E1
. . . En is not possibly knowable as distinct in kind, is to claim that
for any situation distinct in kind from an event possessingE1 . . . En
it is possible to know that it is distinct.
Adopting this position is to attribute a privileged epistemic posi-
tion to the subject of experience. For, according to it, a responsible
subject who wishes to determine how things are with him or herself
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through reflection must not only correctly identify phenomenal
properties of a specific sort when they are present, but also they
cannot be misled into judging them present when they are not. It is
not merely that the properties which determine an event as an exper-
ience are held to be self-evident on this view – that the presence of
such properties indicates to the subject that they are present when
they are present. It must also be the case that the absence of such
properties when they are absent is equally detectible by the subject,
so that there is always some way that a subject could tell that he or
she was not so experiencing when not doing so. It is to attribute to
responsible subjects potential infallibility about the course of their
experiences.
Of course, some philosophers have assumed that these epistemic
properties are definitional of the mental, and so see nothing sub-
stantive in the additional assumption. But the doctrine of infalli-
bilism about the mental is particularly problematic in relation to
sensory states once we are forced to admit that appearances system-
atically appear to us other than they are. For if we can be misled with
respect to some properties of sensory experiences, there is a question
as to what can motivate the claim that we are infallible in other
judgements about them. As I indicated above, part of the motiva-
tion for disjunctivism is precisely the thought that introspection of
our sense experience supports Naïve Realism, and hence forces us
to see both sense-datum and intentional theories as forms of error
theory.
The assessment of this epistemological commitment I’ll leave for
elsewhere. For this discussion, the only point to note is that given the
need to rely on this assumption, an immodest approach to percep-
tual experience carries more theoretical burdens than does a modest
approach. The burden of proof is not on the disjunctivist to show
that we should adopt a less than conjunctive theory of appearances,
the burden is really on any common kind theorist, to show that the
theory they propose is not really too restrictive; or that the added
epistemological burdens which come with demonstrating that are
ones that we should accept.
This points to where Dancy was misled. In fixing on the concept
of perceptual experience in general we seem to have no more
resources than that we need to pick out something indiscriminable
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from veridical perception. So the most inclusive conception we can
have here is an implicitly relational one. Any of the non-relational
specifications that Naïve realist, or sense-datum, or intentional
theories or some other approach can give us would seem just to
offer at best a sufficient condition for meeting the relational specifi-
cation. That would offer simply an account of one particular variant
of experience, rather than an account of what experience must be.
What most Common Kind theories (i.e. theories which endorse the
Common Kind Assumption) ignore is that in giving an account of
experience they normally succeed, if at all, only in giving sufficient
conditions for one’s experience to be a certain way, and fail to show
that the conditions they offer are necessary. Without the latter being
fulfilled, no such theory can claim to give a fully general account of
experience.
Hence we can see that as long as our focus is on the concept
of sensory experience in general, intended to cover all possible
cases of what we would count as a sensory experience of a lavender
bush, then our default position should be that of the disjunctivist.
What we mean by this is no more than this is a situation which is
indiscriminable through reflection from a veridical perception of a
lavender bush.
4. So far, we have been looking at what the disjunctivist should
say about perceptual experience in general. Its account of this is
entirely minimal. For all that has been said, the account is not incon-
sistent with the view that there are some experiences among the
non-veridical ones which fit the characterisations offered by sense-
datum or intentional theories. The disjunctivist’s general conception
of experience does not have the resources to say that no such exper-
iences can occur – as long as those experiences meet the relational
condition of being indiscriminable from a veridical perception,
then the disjunctivist is happy to count them as being among the
perceptual experiences.
However, this cannot exhaust the content of an account of
sensory experience which rejects the Common Kind Assumption.
For, further reflection on the causal argument reveals that there
is a specific range of experiences about which the disjunctivist is
forced to say somewhat more. If disjunctivism is motivated along
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the lines that we are concerned with, namely by the need to resist
the problem of perception in a way that retains both Naïve Realism
and Experiential Naturalism, then a variant of the causal argument
presents the disjunctivist with a challenge. Experiences which share
the proximate causal conditions as veridical perceptions but which
lack the further conditions for being perceptions cannot have Naïve
phenomenal properties. But, as we shall see, there is reason to think
that whatever kind of event these experiences are, the very same kind
of event occurs when one is perceiving. So the disjunctivist needs
an account of these hallucinatory events, and one which remains
consistent with the assertion of Naïve Realism concerning veridical
perception.
The challenge develops in two steps. The first develops from the
so-called causal argument for sense-data or against Naïve Realism.
In that form causal considerations are appealed to in support of the
Common Kind Assumption. Here however, we will be concerned
with a variant of this argument with weaker assumptions to a conclu-
sion that does not entail the Common Kind Assumption. Whether
this conclusion is really consistent with disjunctivism is then the
concern of the second step, which we shall reach below.
The argument we focus on here is based on the versions used by
Howard Robinson.12 It develops so:
(1) When S sees a pine tree at t, call this situation v, there
is in S’s body some complete causal condition just prior
to t which determined the chance of this event of seeing
occurring in v, call this condition N;
(2) It is nomologically possible that N should occur in S even
if no candidate object of perception is present and condi-
tions necessary for the occurrence of a perception are not
met, and an hallucinatory experience instead occurs; call
one such situation h;
(3) Where two situations involve the same proximate causal
conditions, and do not differ in any non-causal conditions
for the occurrence of some kind of effect, then the chances
for the occurrence of such an effect are the same in both
situations;13
(4) No non-causal condition required for the occurrence of
the effects of N is present in h but absent in v;
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(5) Whatever kind of experience occurs in h, there is the same
chance of such an experience occurring in v;
(6) Hence whatever kind of experience does occur in situ-
ations like h, it is possible that such a kind of experience
occurs when one is veridically perceiving.
Our conclusion (6) is not equivalent to affirming the Common Kind
Assumption, however (as Robinson sought to use the stronger initial
version of this argument to establish). For (6) is consistent with
claiming that for the fundamental kind of event which occurs when
one is veridically perceiving, there is no echo in the case of the
causally matching hallucination. But while the disjunctivist may
be spared inconsistency in rejecting the assumption but embracing
(6), the resulting position imposes quite severe constraints on what
can be said about the nature of the kind of experiences which
are common to hallucination and perception in these cases. Before
reviewing that, the argument itself should be further elucidated and
defended.
Premisses (1) and (2) I take to flow from the general methodo-
logical concerns which render unappetising the rejection of the
assumption of Experiential Naturalism. We have broad empirical
grounds for supposing that altering the pattern of activity in an
agent’s visual cortex has consequences for what they can or cannot
see. So there does seem to be a causal dependency of our visual
perceptions on the activity of parts of the brain, even if we do not yet
know the full pattern of this dependency. One may find questionable
the metaphysical assumptions behind the idea of a complete causal
condition for some state or event; but however suspect the notion is,
it is unlikely that a rejection of it would provide suitable refuge for
a defender of disjunctivism. Likewise, premiss (2) depends on the
thought that neuroscientific methodology in general looks to local
neurological causes in order to explain a given pattern of neuro-
logical activity. It may well not be excluded entirely a priori that
there should be action at a distance within the neurological realm,
but few neuroscientists with the hope of serious funding would
pursue the hypothesis seriously. Hence a disjunctivist would be
dialectically in a weak position, if their other commitments forced
them to claim that action at a distance for neurological causes does
in fact occur.14
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However, one might still claim that the other aspect of (2),
regarding what causal conditions produce, does not follow from
our general empirical assumptions. The fact that visual perceptions
depend causally on states of the visual cortex does not in itself
show that the reproduction of those local causes in the absence of
objects of perception would still produce experiences. Some sort
of room is left open for a philosopher to claim that in the absence
of conditions sufficient for perception, the causal preconditions of
perception fail to produce any psychological effect at all. No one
is yet in a position to falsify this hypothesis. So the argument for
(6) is not demonstrative. Nonetheless, this would be a weak posi-
tion for the disjunctivist to end up in: for it would commit them
to determinate empirical consequences which they have insufficient
evidence to predict.
Premiss (3) on the other hand looks like it is a purely metaphys-
ical principle about the nature of causation, and not to be grounded
solely in methodological concerns or broad empirical assump-
tions. This is a severe weakening of a causal principle employed
by Howard Robinson when attacking disjunctivism, namely the
doctrine of ‘Same Cause, Same Effect’. On that view, where any
situations involve the same proximate causal conditions then the
very same kind of effects will occur. There are two modifications to
this idea in premiss (3). First, ‘Same Cause, Same Effect’ is usually
stated in a form which assumes causal determinism where causes
are sufficient for their effects. So stated, one might think that one
could escape the consequences of the principle by denying deter-
minism – indeed, Robinson discusses the prospects of so doing. Yet
is clear that in a world in which there are indeterministic causes,
a form of ‘Same Cause, Same Effect’ can pose problems for a
disjunctivist. After all, the Naïve realist thinks that there is a zero
chance of a veridical perception occurring in a situation where there
is no appropriate candidate to be the object of perception. If there
are causal conditions for veridical perception, then they must give
the occurrence of the event of perceiving a non-zero chance, hence
the chances in the perceptual and hallucinatory circumstances must
be different. Allowing for indeterministic causation alone won’t
provide space for such a consequence. We may as well, then, frame
(3) in terms which allow for the causal connections to be chancy.
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The more significant weakening, however, relates to the clause
in (3) concerning non-causal constitutive conditions. In employing
‘Same Cause, Same Effect’ Robinson and Foster aim to show that
disjunctivism is not consistent with our general thoughts about
the nature of causation. They assume that effects must always be
constrained by patterns of local causation, such that any difference
in two effects must be reflected in a difference in their local causes.
Given this, they plausibly argue that unless there is action at a
distance, distal objects can play no essential role in the individuation
of any psychological event. A parallel line of reasoning can be found
in some discussions of singular thought and of externalism. Various
authors have argued that where one can find no difference in the
causal powers of two psychological states, no difference in their
possible effects, then the two states ought to fall under all the same
psychological kinds. Again no difference in distal conditions alone
are allowed to make a difference in the nature of the psychological
state itself.
If one is committed to this line of thought, then (3) reduces
to an indeterministic version of ‘Same Cause, Same Effect’ since
one is thereby committed to the view that no psychological effects
have any interesting non-causal constitutive conditions attached. Of
course, a disjunctivist who is also a Naïve realist will be ill inclined
to accept ‘Same Cause, Same Effect’ when so formulated. On their
conception of experience, when one is veridically perceiving the
objects of perception are constituents of the experiential episode.
The given event could not have occurred without these entities
existing and being constituents of it; in turn, one could not have
had such a kind of event without there being relevant candidate
objects of perception to be apprehended. So, even if those objects
are implicated in the causes of the experience, they also figure
non-causally as essential constituents of it.
Indeed, setting the discussion within an indeterministic frame-
work offers support to the idea that for the Naïve realist the object
of perception must play a non-causal role in determining whether
the experience is a perception or not, whatever causal role it has in
addition. For when we think of objects or events as having causal
powers, we conceive of them as having the capacity to raise the
chance of an effect, and of inhibitors as lowering the chance that
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would otherwise be there for the effect. In this way, causal influence
is conceivable as coming in degrees. But the only sense in which we
can account for the role for the object of perception as a constituent
of the sensory episode is acting as a necessary condition on the
occurrence of the perceptual event. Mere presence of a candidate
object will not be sufficient for the perceiving of it, that is true, but
its absence is sufficient for the non-occurrence of such an event.
The connection here is not one of degrees of influence but that of a
constitutive or essential condition of a kind of event.
So such theorists will be unimpressed by ‘Same Cause, Same
Effect’ as pressed by Foster and Robinson, and they will seek
to resist any ancillary reasoning designed to make one accept it.
However, they do not have the same reason to reject premiss (3),
since that allows for the possibility that there are such non-causal
constitutive conditions for the occurrence of certain kinds of events.
What (3) retains is one of the main motivations for ‘Same Cause,
Same Effect’ and that is to suppose that where there is genuine
causation, then there is a pattern of causes and effects which has an
implicit generality. If a given causal condition has produced a certain
kind of effect in one context, then there will be some general condi-
tion which differs between the two. It seems that to deny this would
be either to claim that in the case of psycho-physical causation there
need be no such determinacy of cause to effect, or to embrace in
general a radical singularism about causation according to which
the fact that particular causes were related to the effects that they
had implied nothing at all about the general patterns of causation.15
Premiss (3) only has bite in this argument given premiss (4).
If the disjunctivist can claim that there is a non-causal difference
between the hallucinatory situation and the veridical perceptual situ-
ation with respect to the hallucinatory experience, then one will not
be able to generalise back from what is true about this effect in
the one situation to the other. As we noted above, they certainly
do have reason to claim that there is such a non-causal condition
in the case of veridical perception, for there is a candidate object
of perception present which is absent in the hallucinatory situation.
That would block the use of (3) to generalise from whatever is true
of the veridical perception situation to what must be true of the
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hallucinatory situation. In the context of this argument we need to
know whether the converse move can be blocked as well.
Well, one might argue that given that the veridical perceptual
experience could only occur were an object of perception present,
then the absence of such an object is a necessary condition on the
hallucinatory experience occurring, and hence is a non-causal condi-
tion on the occurrence of such a kind of event. Clearly, this condition
isn’t fulfilled when one perceives, and hence one could, consistently
with (3), deny that what occurs when hallucinating occurs when
perceiving. The problem with this response is that it relies on us
conceiving of the psychological effects that the proximate causal
conditions produce entirely in terms of their relation to other situ-
ations than the actual one: we specify the effect by saying it is not a
perception. For of course it is true of any effect which is essentially
not a perception that it requires the absence of conditions which are
sufficient for perception. But one can surely demand that what is
needed is a description of the effect produced relative just to the
situation in which it is produced. In what sense can this simply be
an effect which is not a perception? Surely there is some positive
account of the kind of psychological effect it is. And it is for this
that we need to ask whether any non-causal conditions must be
met. Otherwise, one should have the suspicion that the non-causal
conditions on the occurrence of a perception are somehow counting
twice over: once in the situation where one does have a perception,
and again in the situation where there is no perception and nothing
at all to be perceived. Therefore I suggest that premiss (4) correctly
reflects the thought that is expressed by saying that hallucinations
are ‘inner experiences’. We have the conception that the occurrence
of such events imposes no additional condition on the world beyond
the subject’s putative state of awareness.16
But now with this conceded we end up with (5) and (6) and the
question whether this result is really consistent with a disjunctive
approach to perception. This takes us to the second step of the
argument.
5. To deny that what is present in perception is present in halluci-
nation is quite consistent with admitting that what is present in
hallucination is also present in perception. Even if the disjunctivist
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must grant that he or she is committed to (6), they have not yet
been forced to endorse inconsistent assumptions. But is the position
a coherent resting place? For there is a lingering worry that once
one admits that the hallucinatory experience is common to the two
situations, one undermines the motivations for disjunctivism in the
first place by making the non-common element redundant to the
explanation of the phenomenal aspects of experience.
There are two ways of spelling out the situation described in (6).
One might claim that, when one perceives, two events occur: there is
the genuinely perceptual experiential event, and this has no analogue
in hallucination; then there is the purely experiential event, which
also occurs when one is hallucinating. Given this model it is both
true that something occurs only when one perceives, the genuinely
perceptual experience, and something occurs which can also occur
when one hallucinates, the purely experiential event. But is this a
plausible model?
To answer this we need also to ask how we are to count experi-
ences. If I hear a loud bang and see a bright flash there is a sense in
which I have one experience, the experience of these two perceived
events, a sense in which I have two experiences, a hearing and a
seeing, and a sense in which I have three: the hearing, seeing and
the event hearing-together-with-seeing. However we count these
events, there is an intimate connection among them; perhaps some
are constituents of others. What then of the relation between the
supposed genuinely perceptual experiential event and the purely
experiential event? If we ask of what happened in the subject’s
life such that they could reflect on and report it as such, then there
seems to be just one thing to talk about. If one introspects a perfect
hallucination of seeing a lavender bush, what seems to be available
to introspection is just whatever would be available to introspection
in actually seeing one. In the former case, all that one could intro-
spect would be the one event, the purely experiential event. In the
latter case, there are supposedly two events to introspect: the purely
experiential event and the genuinely perceptual one. So, although
there seems to be some questions to be settled anyway about the
ways in which to count experiences, this proposal seems to double
for us the number with which we answer that question.
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If we say that in fact one can introspect both events in the percep-
tual case, then we need to explain why it should seem as if one
cannot selectively attend to the one experience as opposed to the
other. If we respond to this problem by suggesting that one can
only introspect the genuinely perceptual event when perceiving,
then one needs to explain why the purely experiential event, which
is otherwise introspectible, should be screened out by the genuinely
perceptual one. If we respond instead by saying that it is only the
purely experiential event which one can introspect in both cases,
then we lose the sense that the genuinely perceptual event is the
experience one has when perceiving, that is a part of one’s conscious
life. If it is extruded from that, then the disjunctivist’s position
begins to look like nothing more than a linguistic variant on some
Common Kind view: there is an introspectible element in perceiving
which can be present in perception and hallucination; and there
is a non-introspectible element which is only present when one is
perceiving in virtue of which one counts as perceiving.
But this is not the only way in which one can accommodate (6).
As we initially set the problem up we saw a need to talk not only
of particular events but also the kinds of events that occur. Clearly
events can be of more than one kind just as they can satisfy more
than one description. In some sense no one denies that the one event,
the perception, is of a kind which the other, the hallucination, is not.
What is distinctive of the rejection of the Common Kind Assump-
tion is the thought that the most fundamental kind that the perceptual
event is of, the kind in virtue of which the event has the nature that
it does, is one which couldn’t be instanced in the case of halluci-
nation. So we can accommodate (6) while rejecting the Common
Kind Assumption by claiming that while the perceptual event is
of a fundamental kind which could not occur when hallucinating,
nonetheless this very same event is also of some other psychological
kind or kinds which a causally matching hallucinatory event (i.e. one
brought about by the same proximate causal conditions) belongs to.
Now this proposal faces at least the following formal diffi-
culty. Presumably the hallucinatory event is fundamentally of some
psychological kind. Whatever kind that is, the perceptual event is
also of that kind. However, the perceptual event is not fundamentally
of that kind, since we know that fundamentally it is of some kind
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which does not occur when hallucinating. So the disjunctivist will
need to explain how it can be that one thing can be fundamentally
F, something else can be F and yet not be fundamentally F. This is
an issue to which we shall return below.
More pressing yet, the objector may question whether the
disjunctivist has not still made the kind of episode which is unique
to the perceptual situation redundant in an account of conscious-
ness and the mind. In formulating the acceptance of (6) in terms of
kinds of events rather than in terms of the number of unrepeatable
occurrences, the worry about the absence of a detectable difference
between one event and two can now simply be reformulated in terms
of a worry about the explanatory role of properties: two properties
being present in one case, one property being present in the other.
First, a concern is that hallucinations and veridical perceptions
will have in common certain phenomena that we associate with
experience. Notably, hallucinations no less than perceptions are
liable to coerce our beliefs and move to us action, and from a
subject’s perspective the situation will seem to be one in which they
are doing the right thing by judging that that is a lavender bush when
hallucinating one, if they have no ancillary information that reveals
this not to be a case of perception. Likewise, as we have stressed
throughout, reflection on experience or introspection of it is liable
to lead to much the same judgements about how things are with the
subject: that it looks to him or her as if there is a lavender bush there.
Some of these phenomena we may see as causal (and possibly
rational) consequences of experience: given the nature of experi-
ence, a rational agent would come to make those judgements or act
in this way. Other aspects we might think are partly constituted by
so having an experience: what it is for things to seem one way to a
subject rather than another is for them to be in such an experiential
state. In the case of hallucination, to the extent that these phenomena
do have any explanation, that explanation will derive from appeal
to the kind of experience the subject is then having. And now,
the objector will point out, given (6) above, we must concede that
the very same kind of experience occurs when one is veridically
perceiving. The phenomena which are in common between the
hallucination and the perception are accompanied by a common
kind of occurrence in both situations. So, the objector suggests,
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those phenomena will have a common explanation in the two situ-
ations, namely the occurrence of a kind of experience common to
both perception and hallucination and the kind of event which is
unique to perceptual situations will be explanatorily redundant.17
Consider a parallel case. Suppose one has a machine for sorting
pieces of coloured cloth. The input to the machine is a jumble of
pieces of cloth which are either scarlet or some non-red shade of
colour. All of the scarlet pieces are sorted by the machine into its
left hopper, while all of the other pieces go into the right one. One
might hypothesise that the machine works by discriminating scarlet
samples from other shades, so the presence of a sample in the left
hopper is explained by its being scarlet. However, now consider
another machine of exactly the same model presented with a jumble
of cloth samples some of which are red, not all scarlet, and some
various shades of non-red colours. This machine sorts all of the red
samples, whether scarlet or not into its left hopper and the other
samples into its right hopper. Now the more plausible hypothesis
is that both machines sort samples into their left hoppers because
the samples are red. In the original situation I described, it is still
right to say that the samples in the left hopper are there because
they are scarlet. After all, being scarlet is a way of being red, so
mentioning this shade of the samples does give some explanatory
information. Nonetheless, it seems wrong to say that the samples
are in the hopper because they are scarlet rather than because they
are red. Being red is more highly correlated with being sorted into
the left hopper than being scarlet. So the property of being red here
seems to screen off the property of being scarlet from having an
explanatory role.18
The objector’s worry about perception and hallucination echoes
these intuitions. We have the same resultant phenomena in intro-
spectively matching cases of perception and hallucination, and we
know from the conclusion (6) that where we have causally matching
situations we have the same kinds of event in hallucination and
in perception. So the common kind of event between hallucina-
tion and perception seems better correlated with these common
phenomena than the kind of event unique to perception and so seems
to screen off the purely perceptual kind of event from giving us an
explanation.19
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This concludes the second step in the argument. The disjunctivist
is in a weak position to reject (6), even if the argument for it is not
demonstrative. (6) as it stands is not inconsistent with the letter of
disjunctivism, the rejection of the Common Kind Assumption, but
this does not remove the worry that there is no way of accepting (6)
while still insisting that there is a distinctive role for only veridical
perceptual experiences to play. The disjunctivist cannot remain
simply with the claim about the concept of sensory experience in
general, therefore, but must address the problem that this subset of
cases presents us with. It must find some account of hallucinatory
experiences in cases of proximate causal matching with veridical
perception which does not lead to the screening off of veridical
perception. How are we to proceed?
6. One response to the challenge questions the commonality of
phenomena among perception and hallucination. Just as one may
be a disjunctivist about experience, so too one may be disjunc-
tivist about the consequences of perception. There are at least two
ways in which one might develop this. The first is to claim that
some of the psychological consequences associated with perception
cannot occur if one is hallucinating. For example, if one endorses
an object-dependent conception of singular thought, then percep-
tual demonstrative judgements will not be available for a subject
to make when suffering an hallucination.20 Veridical perceptions
may give rise to judgements such as that that is an orange, but no
perfectly matching hallucination could do the same. One may extend
this by suggesting that some of our intentions in action may be
object-dependent too. Perhaps a subject moved to pick up a visible
object intends that they should grasp that thing over there. But then
no such intention could be present in a case of hallucination. If
actions are individuated not by gross physical movements but by
the intentions with which they are immediately performed, no action
will be in common between a veridical perceptual situation and an
hallucination either.
This mode of response seeks to find something implicitly rela-
tional among the phenomena consequent on perception – where
acts of thinking are object-dependent, a subject can engage in such
acts only given the truth of certain relational facts, that appropriate
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objects exist and stand in a relevant relation to the subject to be
thought about or acted on. A more direct response here would be
to appeal explicitly to relational facts which perceptions can explain
in a way that hallucinations can not. Why was John able to pick
up the glass that was on the table? Because he could see it, and
could see where it was. Both Christopher Peacocke and Timothy
Williamson have insisted that the explanatory potential of such a
relational explanans cannot necessarily be matched by a conjunction
of a non-relational psychological fact and some non-psychological
relational facts in addition.21 So the kind of relational facts which
obtain when one is genuinely perceiving and not merely halluci-
nating (even veridically) may have an explanatory potential for
relational facts which then obtain because of one’s actions which
could not be matched by the experiential properties common to
perception and hallucination.
With these two responses one can at least rebut the challenge that
the disjunctivist’s conception of sensory experience is guaranteed
to be explanatorily redundant. But they are not sufficient to lay the
worries raised here to rest. For the responses block the conclusion
through finding some implicitly or explicitly relational facts which
are not in common between the two situations. This strategy does
not address the question whether there are any common proper-
ties to the two situations which are distinctive of the subject’s
conscious perspective on the world. Nor yet the question whether,
if there are any, why they can only be explained by what is common
to perception and hallucination rather than what is distinctive of
perception.
It would be a severe limitation on the disjunctivist’s commit-
ment to Naïve Realism, if the Naïve realist aspects of perception
could not themselves shape the contours of the subject’s conscious
experience. Yet this aim would be frustrated if we rested with the
above responses, since so far no reason has been offered to show
why we must think of the fabric of consciousness as relational, and
as not common to perception and hallucination. If we are to settle
the concerns here, we need to make clear what can be, and what
need not be, in common among matching perceptions and halluci-
nations. Here the notion of sense experience in general, that of being
indiscriminable from veridical perception, plays a central role. It
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provides an answer to this question, and in turn, as we shall see
below, an answer to the problem we face about (6).
For, the concept of perceptual experience in general is that of situ-
ations indiscriminable from veridical perception and this imposes
quite severe constraints on what properties an hallucinatory exper-
ience must possess, and what properties it must lack. In this way,
the general condition of indiscriminability offers a guide to what
properties we should expect perception and hallucination to share.
If the condition of indiscriminability is to be met, then a situ-
ation of experience must not lack any property necessary for
veridical perception the absence of which is recognisable simply
through reflection. Likewise no such situation may possess any
property incompatible with veridical perception whose presence is
recognisable through reflection. If the former condition were not
met, the claim of not knowable difference from perception could
not be met: a subject might recognise the absence of the property
in question when possessing the background knowledge that the
property in question is a necessary condition of veridical perception;
such a subject could thereby know on the basis of reflection that
this was not a case of veridical perception. In the second case, the
recognisable presence of a property incompatible with perception
would likewise stand witness to the fact that this situation is in fact
discriminable from veridical perception.
It was claimed above that introspection of veridical perception
provides evidence in favour of Naïve Realism. That is to say, when
one introspects one’s veridical perceptions one recognises that this
is a situation in which some mind-independent object is present and
is a constituent of the experiential episode. Not all matching percep-
tual experiences will possess this property. A case of hallucination
brought about through suitable stimulation of the brain will either
lack an object altogether or present a merely mind-dependent one.
Given the conditions outlined above, the lack of this property is not
recognisable in such a case of experience. This constraint might
be met in either of two ways. First, one might claim that in the
case of veridical perception, the presence of this property is not
really recognisable, that one cannot, after all, introspect that mind-
independent objects are constituents of the experiential situation.
Taking this route would be to deny that there are after all any intro-
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spective grounds for endorsing Naïve Realism. But this conclusion
is not forced on us by the constraint in question. For the second
route is simply to accept that although the hallucinatory situation
lacks the property in question, one cannot know that the property is
absent simply by reflection on this situation and hence that it at least
seems to be present.
Note that we must take care in interpreting the use of ‘seems’
here. It is common for philosophers to remark that seems talk can be
used in different ways, sometimes to introduce talk of sensory states
or events and sometimes simply to indicate a subject’s evidential
position or inclinations to believe.22 Certainly the former would
be inappropriate here. The point of the claim is not that when the
subject has the hallucination, they are in some sensory state of
the seeming presence of a lavender bush. Though this would be
true, it would not be illuminating point to make. Rather, the aim
is to explain the sense in which an hallucinatory state may match
a perceptual state. In order for the claim to play this role, we need
to understand ‘seems’ in a purely epistemological sense: to say that
it seems to the subject as if this is a situation in which a lavender
bush is a constituent of the experiential situation is just to say that
the subject would be unable to tell this situation apart from one in
which the subject would correctly recognise the presence of such a
constituent. Whether this epistemological reading is sufficient to the
task at hand is an issue to which we shall return.
Going in the reverse direction, we can determine of some partic-
ular matching hallucination that even if it possesses some distinctive
feature not present in any veridical perception, one will not be able
to recognise this feature of it just through introspection. Suppose,
then, that an hallucination of a lavender bush may be realised in a
situation where a subject is presented with a mind-dependent array
of coloured patches, impressionistically resembling the light and
form presented on a North London street. If this is to be a genuinely
matching experience, reflection on and introspection of the scene
presented cannot reveal its status as a mind-dependent array.
So in general we can claim the following: if any property of a
veridical perception is introspectible – i.e. is recognisably present
in perception through reflection – then such a property will either
be present in all matching experiences, or will at least seem to be
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present, i.e. will not be knowably absent. Likewise, no property of a
matching experience which is not a perception will be recognisable
as such through introspection. So the common properties of percep-
tion and all matching experiences, including hallucinations, will just
be either introspectible properties which are shared, or properties
which all the experiences seem to have (i.e. cannot be known to
lack through introspection).
Correspondingly, we can determine which consequences of
experiences will be co-present in cases of perception and matching
hallucination through similar considerations. For example, if
veridical perception gives rise to rational judgement about the
environment, then an hallucinating subject will be equally inclined
to judgement as a perceiving one. A propensity to make a judgement
is one, one can normally detect through reflection on the situation.
If an agent had no propensity to judge that a lavender bush is present
when having the hallucination of one, then the absence of inclina-
tion here would be a detectable difference from the case of veridical
perception and hence a ground for discriminating the two situations.
In this way, we can say in the basic case it is not merely that an
agent does not know that they are not perceiving when hallucinating,
where this indicates something consistent with agnosticism on the
matter. If an agent in the case of veridical perception can judge that
there is a bush there, or that they are seeing a bush, then in a case
of perfect hallucination they cannot be left with no inclination one
way or the other to judge the presence of bushes or the sighting of
bushes. Rather they must equally be inclined to judge that there is
a bush there and that they see one. In this case then, positively it
must seem to them as if a bush is there and the sighting of a bush is
occurring. The matching of the rational consequences of perception
and hallucination will thereby carry over to action and behaviour
more generally.
Despite the minimal constraint that indiscriminability imposes
on the match between perception and hallucination, it provides all
we need to answer our question about the properties shared between
perception and hallucination. Given an initial assumption that
perception has certain detectible consequences, indiscriminability
requires that either hallucinations possess the very same properties
or at least that they have the property of seeming to reflection to have
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those properties. Likewise, whatever properties an hallucination
actually possesses, we must suppose them undetectable unless some
veridical perception can also possess them or seem to possess them.
These two consequences together tell us what we can assume are in
common between perceptions and hallucinations in general.
7. With the answer to this question, we are just a step away from
solving our problem. For we can also see that the fact that a perfectly
matching hallucination is indiscriminable from a veridical percep-
tion is a fact potentially explanatory of several of the features of
a situation. Why did James shriek like that? He was in a situation
indiscriminable from the veridical perception of a spider. Given
James’s fear of spiders, when confronted with one he is liable so
to react; and with no detectable difference between this situation
and such a perception, it must seem to him as if a spider is there, so
he reacts in the same way.
Is being indiscriminable from veridical perception really
explanatory in this way? I argued above that being indiscriminable
from veridical perception is the most inclusive conception we have
of what sensory experience is. At best an intentional account or
sense-datum view offers us an account of some sufficient condition
for so experiencing, but there is no reason as yet to think any such
account exhaustive of our conception. On an immodest conception
of sensory experience, it comes as no surprise that an hallucina-
tion should have many of the same consequences as a veridical
perception, and a common explanation will be sought in terms of
the defining characteristics of such experience, E1 . . . En, that both
the perception and the hallucination are alleged to share. So for such
a theorist, the idea that the property of being indiscriminable from
a veridical perception should have an explanatory role would seem
implausible – surely such a property would be screened off from
being explanatorily useful since E1 . . . En will be present in both
cases and adequate to the task. Once we recognise, however, that
there is no reason to suppose that all hallucinations need have E1
. . . En, we can see that even if in some cases the presence of E1
. . . En may explain the consequences of a sensory experience, we
have no reason to think that that could be the only such explana-
tion. There may be situations which possess characteristics E′1 . . .
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E′n quite distinct from E1 . . . En yet equally indiscriminable from
the veridical perception of a tree. We might then think of each of
these sets of properties as ways of realising the property of being
indiscriminable from a veridical perception. And then in that case,
while each has some claim to explanatory potential, nonetheless
an appeal to the determinable property of being indiscriminable
from veridical perception may nonetheless be more explanatory
precisely because it is present in a wider range of cases. Witness
again our example of the sorting machine – an object is red through
being scarlet or crimson or some other such shade. Nonetheless a
swatch of cloth being red may be more explanatory of the machine’s
behaviour than the swatch being scarlet.
Nonetheless, the thought that the property of being indiscrimi-
nable from a seeing of a tree can have an explanatory role and
have such in virtue of its relation to the property of seeing a tree
generates a surprising conclusion in the light of our problem to do
with screening off. Recall that any veridical perception of a tree is
indiscriminable from itself, so the property of being indiscriminable
from a veridical perception of a tree will be common to a case of
veridical perception of a tree and a perfectly matching hallucination
of the same. The indiscriminability property is, therefore, a common
property across the situations with the potential to explain common
consequences, while the property of being a veridical perception
is unique to the one case. If we should just apply the principle
of screening off universally without restriction, then we should
conclude that being indiscriminable from a veridical perception of a
tree screens off the property of being a veridical perception of a tree.
But if that is so, then the property of being a veridical perception
of a tree never has an explanatory role, since it is never instan-
tiated without the property of being indiscriminable from such a
perception being instantiated as well. But if the property of being
a veridical perception lacks any explanatory role, then we can no
longer show that being indiscriminable from a veridical perception
has the explanatory properties which would screen off the property
of being a veridical perception.
This puzzling consequence suggests either that we were wrong to
assume that veridical perceptions do have a distinctive explanatory
role, or that there must be some limitation to the intuitive prin-
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ciple about cases of screening off. Surely the former option is not
palatable: nothing about the structure of the case really exploits
features special to the case of perception. For any property we like
that has effects partly in virtue of being recognised to be what it is,
we can consider the parallel property of being indiscriminable from
that property and our above line of reasoning will go through. It is
overwhelmingly more plausible to suppose that there are limitations
to the range of application of the principle of screening off.
In fact, in relation to cases of causation, it is commonly noted
that such tests provide the wrong result for what caused what when
we have cases of pre-emption. If my bullet pierces the vistim’s heart
before yours, then the victim is killed by me, even if in a parallel
case without my bullet but still with yours, the victim would still
have died. The fact that your bullet is present in both cases where
the same effect occurs does not show that it must be the cause in
both. Our present example indicates that there are parallel cases
to pre-emption in the case of explanation. Moreover, one might
tentatively suggest here why the limitation needs to imposed on the
test for screening off. In our present example, what seems key is
the thought that the explanatory properties of the common property
are derivable a priori from the special property. We can tell that the
common property must be correlated with the outcome just from
knowing what the special property can otherwise explain. Hence,
there is a reason to think that the property of being indiscriminable
from an F has an explanatory potential which is dependent on the
explanatory potential of being an F. The same was not so in the
case of scarlet and red, for while red has an explanatory potential
deriving just from being the determinable of scarlet, its explanatory
potential is not exhausted by that. So we may conclude that, as with
cases of pre-emption, cases of inherited or dependent explanatory
potential offer us exceptions to the general model of common
properties screening off special ones.
8. Over the last few pages we have been pursuing the question
whether one can coherently reject the Common Kind Assumption
yet accept (6), the conclusion of the causal argument. The discussion
of the last few pages should bring out quite how hard it is for the
disjunctivist to maintain this position. For, suppose we accept that
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causally matching hallucinations, those with the same proximate
causes as veridical perceptions, have some positive characterisation
in terms favoured by immodest approaches, then the disjunctivist
will be forced to grant that they do not have a coherent position.
For example, if we assume that the causally matching hallucination
is an event which represents the presence of a tree – that is, its
having such representational properties are taken to explain why the
experience is as it is and has the consequences that it does – then the
explanation we can give of the salient features of the hallucination,
and of how it brings about its effects, should equally be applicable to
the case of veridical perception. After all, the explanatory potential
of such properties is surely independent of whether the veridical
perception of a tree independently could provide an explanation
of these phenomena. On this assumption, the problem of explana-
tory screening off would certainly be pressing, and so granting that
the perception and the hallucination possess these representational
properties would imply that the Naïve realist aspects of the percep-
tion are explanatorily idle. The same conclusion should be drawn if
we account for the causally matching hallucination in terms of being
the presentation of some mind-dependent array of colour patches.
So while the disjunctivist can be agnostic about the nature of many
hallucinations – they may be representational or subjective as long
as they meet the condition of indiscriminability – when it comes to
causally matching experiences, they are forced to reject any such
positive characterisation.
At the same time, we have seen a range of properties which
causally matching hallucinations can share with veridical percep-
tions without threatening the explanatory role of being a veridical
perception: namely properties of being indiscriminable from the
veridical perception. So this suggests that the disjunctivist can
coherently hold on to the denial of the Common Kind Assump-
tion and the truth of (6) by insisting that for just such experiences:
i.e. causally matching hallucinations, the only mental properties
that such events possess are those of being indiscriminable from
veridical perceptions and any properties which follow from their
being so indiscriminable. For these events alone, there is nothing
more to characterise them than what can be said about the concept
of perceptual experience in general.
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But what does this restriction amount to? At the very least, it
leads us to deny Dancy’s assumption when he writes, ‘there may
be available a more direct characterization of the second disjunct’.
On the account proposed here, the disjunctivist is committed to
saying that, at least when it comes to a mental characterisation of
the hallucinatory experience, nothing more can be said than the rela-
tional and epistemological claim that it is indiscriminable from the
perception. There is a sense, then, in which the disjunctivist insists
that there is only a negative characterisation of causally matching
hallucinatory experience: it is nothing but a situation which could
not be told apart from veridical perception. This fact links with
the formal concern mentioned at the start of our discussion of (6):
how could it be that the veridical perception is fundamentally of
one kind and yet also of some other kind which it shares with the
hallucination, where the hallucination must fundamentally be of that
kind. Clearly for a veridical perception, being a veridical perception
of a tree is a better candidate for being its fundamental or essen-
tial kind than being indiscriminable from being such a veridical
perception. When we turn to the case of the hallucinatory exper-
ience, there are no other candidates for the kind of mental event
it is – at least according to the disjunctivist – other than its being
indiscriminable from the veridical perception; faute de mieux this is
then the fundamental mental character of the event.
The essentially negative and relational characterisation here bears
also on a criticism Timothy Williamson has made of disjunctive
theories of mental states.23 Focusing on McDowell’s account of
knowledge, Williamson raises the question whether resistance to
traditional analyses of knowledge as ‘justified true belief plus’
should frame itself as a form of disjunctivism. In the case of knowl-
edge, the disjunctivist would seem to be forced to analyse belief in
terms of a disjunction of either knowledge or some other state, ‘mere
opinion’, as we might say. Williamson presses the disjunctivist to
give an account of the other state, mere opinion, in a manner which
will hold only of non-knowledge cases and not equally apply to the
case of knowledge itself. The conclusion he reaches is that there is
no good candidate for this: and that we should allow that the situ-
ation of knowledge and the contrast cases both satisfy conditions for
the common presence of belief: the concept of belief is autonomous
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and not reducible to the idea of knowledge or failed knowledge. As
a result, Williamson suggests that the heart of resistance should be a
form of non-conjunctivism: even if belief is an independent notion
always present with knowledge and non-knowledge, knowledge is
not to be analysed as belief plus something else.
I don’t want to comment here on the success of Williamson’s
discussion of knowledge but rather to emphasise the difference of
situation in relation to perception and sensory appearances, at least
according to the position we have been concerned with here. As
we have seen, Williamson is right that the notion of sensory exper-
ience that we end up with is one we are happy to say is equally
present in cases of veridical perception and hallucination. When we
specify cases of hallucination we do not do so therefore in terms
of something which is only present in cases of hallucination – the
presence of a mere or inner experience which couldn’t occur in
a case of genuine veridical perception. While some hallucinations
might have a nature incompatible with being a veridical perception –
hallucinations for which a sense-datum or intentional account were
directly appropriate – we have seen that there are some hallucina-
tions whose nature would have to be consistent with that kind of
event occurring when one perceives veridically as well. So the label
‘disjunctivism’ would be misleading if it had to indicate that what
occurs in the two kinds of case is necessarily incompatible. At
the same time, though, there is still something appropriate about
expressing the view in disjunctive form. For all that can be said
about the hallucination at a mental level is by contrast with the case
of veridical perception, and that is just to indicate how the event is
not as the veridical perception is. The notion common to percep-
tion and hallucination, that of sensory experience, lacks explanatory
autonomy from that of veridical perception. And isn’t that just what
we express by saying that either this is a case of veridical perception,
in which case certain consequences follow, or it is merely one of
being indiscriminable from such a perception, in virtue of which
certain other consequences follow?
Still, this leaves us with a striking consequence of disjunctivism:
there are certain mental events, at least those hallucinations brought
about through causal conditions matching those of veridical
perceptions, whose only positive mental characteristics are negative
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epistemological ones – that they cannot be told apart by the subject
from veridical perception. I’ll return briefly below to what one might
identify as the core of resistance here, but in concluding I want
finally to spell out just a few of the key features of indiscriminability
that as we have seen, need to be relied on heavily by a disjunctive
account.
9. It is a nice question how exactly the disjunctivist should articu-
late the way in which indiscriminability is employed in the
positive account of the notion of perceptual experience in general.
First, there seem to be some obvious counter-examples to the
claim that indiscriminability provides sufficient conditions for
an event’s being a sensory experience. Second, there are some
problem cases generated by the seeming non-transitivity of apparent
sensory indiscriminability. Finally, endorsing indiscriminability as
a criterion of sameness across sensory experiences itself imposes
certain restrictions on how things can seem to one to be when one
suffers an hallucinatory experience.
Suppose John is inclined to inattention, or hastiness in judge-
ment. When presented with an elm he is liable to treat the situation
as one of being presented with a beech. When presented with a
sample of scarlet he treats indifferently with being presented with
a sample of vermillion. It is not inappropriate for us to describe
John’s situation by saying that he can’t discriminate a beech from
an elm, nor scarlet from vermillion. But saying that for John there
is no discriminable difference between these things is surely not to
say that he experiences them all the same. So here indiscriminability
would seem to be insufficient for sameness of experience.
The point seems more acute when we consider animals other than
humans. To discriminate two things is to judge them non-identical.
If one is to judge two experiences as of different kinds, one needs
a concept of experience with which to make this judgement. We
are inclined to ascribe to many creatures sentience where we with-
hold the attribution of sufficient sapience for self-consciousness. In
that case, these creatures lack concepts of experience, as with other
mental states. They cannot therefore judge that one experience is of
the same or of different kind from any other experience. Does this
not mean that all of their experiences are indiscriminable from each
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other for them, since they cannot judge them to be distinct? In turn,
does that then have the consequence according to the disjunctivist
that all of their experiences are the same?24
In response, we need to note an importance difference between
ascribing capacities or incapacities to a particular individual, or
group of individuals, and more impersonal ascriptions of such
capacities or incapacities which are not relativised to individuals at
all. For example, contrast the claim that the fretwork on the screen
is invisible to Mary with the claim that the fretwork is invisible
simpliciter. The former claim implicates to the audience that Mary’s
sight is in some way deficient – perhaps she is short sighted, or
perhaps her sight is not good in low lighting. Quite consistently with
this claim, one may insist that the fretwork is perfectly visible, that it
is visible to John, Alan or the normally sighted viewer. In contrast to
talk of something’s being visible or invisible per se without relativis-
ing to a viewer indicates that it cannot be seen by normally sighted
people, and in certain contexts the claim may indicate that it couldn’t
even be seen by a creature with abnormally acute vision.
In general, where we ascribe an incapacity to someone, we
indicate not only that they have failed to do something, but also that
there is some ground in virtue of which they so fail. When we think
of an individual’s incapacity in relation to the specific ground for his
or her incapacity – a ground which explains not only why they do
not do F, but would not even do F in similar circumstances – we can
still recognise that this impossibility or incapacity is quite consistent
with the possibility that others do do F or at least could do it. On
the other hand, when we talk of an incapacity or inability without
indicating a subject lacking the capacity or incapacity, then we need
not think in terms of a ground relative to an agent in virtue of which
the act cannot be carried out. To say that something is invisible is
not to indicate some specific lack in certain viewers, but rather to
indicate something about it, that it cannot be seen. In parallel, when
we talk of two things being indiscriminable, we need not mean that
there is something about a given agent in virtue of which they cannot
be told apart, but simply that it is not possible to know that they are
distinct.
When the disjunctivist appeals to the idea of two things being
indiscriminable through reflection in explicating the concept of
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sensory experience, it is this impersonal form of an incapacity or
inability ascription that must be intended. What is being claimed is
that, ex hypothesi, in a circumstance of perfect hallucination, matters
are such that it is just not possible to know through reflection alone
that this is not a situation of veridically perceiving some scene. So,
it is entirely consistent with this appeal to indiscriminability to grant
that two experiences might be indiscriminable through reflection for
some particular agent, John, without the two experiences thereby
being of the same kind. For John may be unable to know the differ-
ence between them due to some specific incapacity on his part – the
excess of alcohol or lack of interest in the matter – which would not
generalise to other individuals. In contrast, the disjunctivist explains
sameness of experience by appealing to the unrelativised or imper-
sonal sense of incapacity. That we can conceive of situations in
which two experiences are different but not such as to be noticed
by a given individual, does not show that we have access to the idea
of experiences which are genuinely different but not noticeably so
impersonally.
Likewise, when we turn to the experiences of sentient but unself-
conscious creatures, to the extent that we do have a positive grip
on the kinds of experience that they can have, and which can differ
one from the other, we also have a grip on how such experience
would be discriminable through reflection or not. As self-conscious
creatures, we cannot help but classify experiences as they would
be available to reflection as the same or different. So that a dog
might fail to discriminate one experience from another, making no
judgement about them as identical or distinct at all, that is not to say
that we cannot judge, in ascribing them such experience, that there
is an event which would or would not be judgeably different from
another experience.
A different kind of challenge to the sufficiency of indiscrimi-
nability for identity of kind of experience comes from the alleged
non-transitivity of indiscriminability for some observable proper-
ties. Certainly, given observers on particular occasions may fail
to detect the difference in shade between sample A and sample
B, and also fail to detect the difference between sample B and
sample C, and yet be able to detect the difference between sample A
and sample C. If this leads us to the conclusion that experiences
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of A are indiscriminable from experiences of B, and experiences
of B are indiscriminable from experiences of C, then we face a
problem supposing that there are kinds of event which are sensory
experiences of colour shades on the disjunctivist proposal. The
indiscriminability of experience of A and experience of B would
require us to suppose that these are just the same kind of experi-
ence; likewise for the experience of B and of C. By transitivity of
identity, this requires that the kind of experience one has of A is of
the same kind as the experience one has of C, but this contradicts
the observation that the experience of C is discriminable from the
experience of A since kinds of experience are discriminable only
where distinct.
There are broadly two responses the disjunctivist can make
here. On the one hand, they can point out that the contradiction
derives from assuming that we can indeed talk about kinds of
perceptual experience as I have throughout this paper, indifferently
among perceptions, illusions and hallucinations. But the examples
of distinct but indiscriminable shades could be taken to show that
since our notion of perceptual experience is just grounded in the
unknowability of distinctness of perception and hallucination there
is no well-founded notion of kind of perceptual experience. All the
facts about experiences in general are to be stated just in terms of
whether a subject could know the distinctness of these experiences
through reflection on their circumstance. This pattern of facts is just
not well enough behaved to ground the existence of kinds.
On the other hand, despite the appeal of apparent examples of
indiscriminable but distinct shades, one can seek to resist the argu-
ment and hold on to the idea of perceptual experience as forming
kinds. One might follow Graff’s suggestion that there is simply no
good reason to believe in the existence of phenomenal continua and
hence insist that if two samples really do look alike then they share
a look.25 Even if a subject may on occasion fail to notice the differ-
ence in look between adjacent samples, and indeed may be bound to
fail to notice such a difference, nonetheless there is a difference to be
noticed and which could be noticed. Alternatively, one may follow
Williamson’s suggestion that while in a given context a subject may
fail to discriminate two samples, this does not show that there is no
context in which the samples are discriminable and hence one can
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hold on to the claim that distinct samples are discriminable in at least
some context.26 By suitable application of the idea of impersonal
indiscriminability, we can then insist that the experiences of A and
of B are in fact discriminable, even if in the given context a subject
fails to discriminate A from B and consequently fails to discriminate
the experience of A from the experience of B.
In fact, the disjunctivist will need to avail themselves of the
latter response in any event to deal with sensory margins for error
where the dimensions of variation do not even appear to generate
a continuum. If I can tell by looking that there are fifty people in
the room, give or take five, then I can’t discriminate just by looking
fifty people from forty-five or from fifty-five, yet I can discriminate
forty-five from fifty-five. If we gloss this by saying that the experi-
ence of forty-five people is indiscriminable from the experience of
fifty people, and appeal to indiscriminability through reflection as
the criterion of sameness of experience we end up with the same
inconsistency as above – the experience of fifty-five will both be
identical and not identical with the experience of forty-five. Here,
the disjunctivist will need to emphasise the difference between the
scene actually present on a given occasion, which may contain fifty
people, from the kind of veridical experience this gives rise to. For
if there are limited powers of visual discrimination here, then we
need to recognise that the very same type of situation can give rise
to different kinds of experience – a presentation of fifty people may
give rise to the same kind of experience as a presentation of forty-
five people, but it may also give rise to the same kind of experience
as a presentation of fifty-five people. The perception of forty-five
people never gives rise veridically to the same kind of experience as
the veridical perception of fifty-five people, and these two distinct
kinds of experience are discriminable, as indeed they are when occa-
sioned by seeing forty-five people and then fifty-five people. But
since someone who is seeing fifty people may have either one of
these experiences, it need not be that in all circumstances an experi-
ence of the kind one has when viewing forty-five people will always
be noted as different by one from one in which one views fifty-five
people. For example, on repeated presentation of fifty people, it may
be that one has the one kind of experience and then the other without
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being able to tell that there is any seeming difference in the number
of people present to one.
We should note one more consequence of taking indiscrimi-
nability as the criterion of sameness: the importance of the contrast
between perceptions as individual events of particular situations,
and perceptions as kinds of event, experiences which the individual
perceptions fall under. For a given perception of a scene, it makes
perfect sense to suppose that that very experience, i.e. the indi-
vidual event, is a presentation of some particular individual object
or some particular unrepeatable event. If we are to ask about the
kind of experience it is, where we include by this the experience
that one could have were one hallucinating, then we appeal to the
indiscriminability of one experience from another. But now identical
twins can be perceptually indiscriminable, so presumably the exper-
iences of them will be reflectively indiscriminable. By this criterion,
such perceptions give rise to the same kind of experience. Hence as
a kind of experience, the particular objects or events drop out of the
individuation of the experience.
Now this conclusion may seem puzzling. For we can certainly
make sense of the idea of suffering an hallucination of the presence
of Winston Churchill in the room. So it might look as if the disjunc-
tivist is forced to press a surprising and substantive claim about what
one can or cannot have an hallucinatory experience of. However,
what I think this really brings out is that we can contrast two ways
in which a given individual or event can feature in relation to our
experience of the world. In one way, a particular object can be a part
of one’s experience of the world just in virtue of being the thing that
one is currently aware of as presenting the particular visible appear-
ance one attends to. One need have in this case no recognitional
capacity for just that individual in order to be able to experience just
them. But we do also have recognitional capacities and we certainly
talk as if our recognitional capacities reflect sameness and differ-
ence in how we experience the world. A given individual can look
to me to be Winston Churchill, as long as I am both acquainted
with Churchill (perhaps only through descriptions, photographs or
other representations) and have an appropriate sensitivity to ways
in which Winston Churchill can look. Now this latter way in which
Winston Churchill can enter my experience is certainly something
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independent of the actual presence of Churchill: on some occasion I
may see someone appropriately dressed such that in seeing them
it looks to me as if Churchill is in the room. So, if I have such
a capacity targeted on Churchill, it may yet be true that when I
hallucinate, the experience I have is as of Churchill in that it brings
to bear this recognitional capacity.
Now note, that in a case in which one really sees someone who
one sees as Churchill, i.e. one sees an individual and experiences
them as recognisably being Churchill, there are two dimensions to
talk about the appropriateness of the experience. Is this really a case
of looking like Churchill (or has one mistaken an appearance, say of
De Gaulle for Churchill in haste)? And, is the person who looks this
way really Churchill, or someone who just looks the way Churchill
looks? The import of the disjunctivist view of hallucination is just
this common sense thought. When we consider a case of halluci-
nating Churchill, although the first question can still be raised, is
this really a case of something’s having the look of Churchill, the
second question cannot be raised at all. There is no distinction to
be drawn between really hallucinating Churchill to be a certain way
and hallucinating an individual with Churchill’s look. And that there
should be no answer to this latter question is hardly contrary to our
common thoughts about perception and hallucination.
In closing this section, I need to mention a couple of limita-
tions in our discussion which need to be removed before we have
a complete account of the matter.27 Throughout I have written
as if we are concerned solely with cases of perfect hallucination
in which the scene hallucinated matches a situation of veridically
perceiving some scene for what it is. Now a first concern with this is
that we may question whether every conceivable hallucination has
a corresponding veridical perception for it to match. Consider an
hallucination of an Escher-like scene with an impossible staircase,
for example; or the non-perception of Mark Johnston’s example
of supersaturated red. How does the account so far offered deal
with these? We need first to highlight another limitation. Few, if
any hallucinations, are perfect hallucinations: rather a subject may
perceive some aspects of a scene and hallucinate or misperceive
other aspects. So how is the account to be extended to these cases?
One move would be to discuss not experiences per se but rather the
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various aspects of an experience, the different entities which one can
experience and the ways in which they can appear to one. On a given
occasion, seeing a lavender bush may involve the occurrence of a
state of awareness whose specific character involves the awareness
of various of the leaves and branches of the bush, the steely light
of a London sky, the intricate patterns of dirt that line a city street.
But there are other ways to see a lavender bush, and such seeings
need have nothing particular in common with this viewing, other
than they are all the perceptions of a lavender bush. To generalise
the account, we would need to fix on the various aspects of a state
of perceptual awareness, the ways in which it may be the same or
different from other such states of awareness. Focusing just on cases
of veridical perception, we can say that these aspects will all involve
the presentation of that entity as it is. In turn, a sensory experience of
that sort is the occurrence of a situation which is indiscriminable in
this particular respect from a perception of the element in question.
The beginning of an approach to partial hallucinations is then
to explain those aspects of the experience which are not perceptual
in terms of that aspect of experience’s indiscriminability from the
corresponding aspect of a perceptual awareness of that element.
In turn, one may seek to explain certain impossible experiences
not by direct appeal to the idea of a veridical perception of that
scene, but rather by explaining how an experience with each of
the constituent elements is indiscriminable in that respect from a
perception of that element. More needs to be said here – not least
to accommodate aspects of the phenomenal character of experience
which arise from global properties of a scene, the combination of
elements, rather than just atomic elements of the presentation of
objects or colour points in a given scene. That detailed elaboration
belongs elsewhere, here I aim only to sketch how one might set
about developing such an account.
10. Over the course of this paper, I’ve tried to fill out in some more
detail what disjunctivism about perception needs to be committed to.
There is a common thought that disjunctivism is a counter-intuitive
thesis about sensory experience and that such an approach has so far
been only incompletely specified, since we need to know more about
the case of illusory or hallucinatory experience than disjunctivists
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are wont to say. What I’ve argued here is that the focus of discus-
sion should rest with opposing views about the relation between
phenomenal character or properties of experience and some of its
epistemological properties, how it can be known to be the same or
different from some other mental event simply through reflection on
one’s circumstance.
In the first part of the paper, I argued that there is good
reason to think that the disjunctivist is right to suppose that our
broadest conception of perceptual experience is simply that which
the disjunctivist uses – namely that of being indiscriminable through
reflection from veridical perceptions. However, as the latter part of
the paper presses, this agnosticism is not where the disjunctivist can
rest. At least when such a view is motivated in part by a concern
to recognise the place of mental events within a natural causal
order, it needs to take into account the possibility of hallucinations
brought about through proximally causally matching circumstances
to veridical perceptions. In such cases, I’ve argued, the disjunctivist
really has no option other than to claim that such experiences have
no positive mental characteristics other than their epistemological
properties of not being knowably different from some veridical
perception.
I take it that it is at this point that the resistance to the disjunctive
approach will be at its most acute. Can it really be that in a case
of perfect hallucination there is no more to how things are with me,
than that I cannot and could not tell this situation apart from genuine
veridical perception? Surely that epistemological property of the
circumstance is simply grounded in the positive presence of the
phenomenal properties which are manifest to me when I reflect on
my situation. Press this intuition further. We will be most convinced
of this idea if we suppose that we do have insight into what it
takes for one to have a sensory experience, that we can identify the
relevant non-epistemological mental features which act as a ground
to the facts of indiscriminability that the disjunctivist appeals to.
The issue here touches on some yet deeper concerns. Most, I
suspect, think the kind of subjectivity we have as finite beings
requires the presence of phenomenal consciousness. Moreover,
there is some temptation to think of phenomenal consciousness
as something conceivable independently of our self-awareness or
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self-conscious reflection on our situation and as something prior
to such self-consciousness which acts as the ground for it. So, one
might think, the presence or absence of phenomenal consciousness
can be determined independently of the presence of self-conscious
awareness or reflection on it, and only given its presence do we
have a subject with genuine subjectivity. From this perspective,
the disjunctivist’s conception of these cases seems to introduce a
form of philosophical zombie: a subject who may have thoughts
and possess the ability to make judgements about phenomenal
consciousness but who lacks phenomenal consciousness proper. In
that case, one’s intuition will be that the subject so described is not
properly conscious and lacks genuine subjectivity or point of view
on the world.
Of course, given that we have the strong intuition that an unfortu-
nate subject who is subject to a total hallucination must still be
conscious (after all this is the force of the objection to the disjunc-
tivist), this picture forces us to think of phenomenal conscious-
ness as constitutively independent of any relation to the world. In
somewhat overblown terms, one might then think of phenomenal
consciousness as some special stuff which gets added to the thoughts
and other mental elements in order to engender subjectivity. In
contrast, the Naïve realist is moved by the thought that phenomenal
consciousness, as we are initially inclined to think of it in first reflec-
tion, is not any such stuff, but instead simply the presence to us of
the ordinary world around us. Such presence is, ex hypothesi, absent
when a subject suffers a total hallucination. Holding on to this rela-
tional conception of phenomenal conscious requires us, therefore, to
think of the hallucinatory case in a different way from the story told
above.
And the disjunctivism we have spelled out here suggests a more
complex link between phenomenal consciousness and self-consci-
ous awareness than the story told immediately above. What we
do, the disjunctivist suggests, is to exploit our own self-conscious
awareness and memory of experience in conceiving of how it would
be to be presented with a lavender bush or how it would be to
be in a situation indiscriminable from this. In our conception of
the situation we exploit elements of self-consciousness and self-
awareness, and in this we can see being so self-conscious is quite
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sufficient for subjectivity. This is not to say that self-consciousness
supports subjectivity independent of phenomenal consciousness, as
if a philosophical zombie had a point of view on the world but lacked
phenomenal feel. Rather in managing to conceive of how things
are from the subject’s perspective in the case of total hallucina-
tion in terms of its being indiscriminable from veridical perception,
we thereby imagine phenomenal consciousness too. What we don’t
have, though, is a grasp of what phenomenal consciousness in
general must be like in a way that is prior to and independent of
epistemological concerns: what we can and cannot know of one’s
own position through introspective reflection.
At this point there are two morals from our discussion above that
it is important to keep in mind. The first is that we really should
be sceptical of having any grasp on a necessary condition for how
an event should be in order to be sense experience, apart from
the modest criterion of indiscriminability from perception through
reflection. For, as was remarked earlier, that could be so only if
we have such powers of introspection that we not only successfully
detect the presence of certain self-intimating properties when they
are instantiated, but are sensitive to their absence when they are not.
Few are now prepared to endorse the existence of the kind of infalli-
bility of judgements about the mind which this position requires.
The point of our discussion is really to draw out how far reaching
the consequences of that reluctance can be.
The second moral concerns the initial motivation for disjunc-
tivism. I’ve suggested that we should be moved to this position
in defence of a natural conception of how our veridical percep-
tual experience relates us to the world around us. That is what
leads us to Naïve Realism. Hence, taking that view seriously forces
one to acknowledge that both sense-datum and intentional theories
of perception amount to error-theories of sense experience. For if
ordinary reflection leads to the acceptance of Naïve Realism, then
such ordinary reflection cannot disclose the real nature of sense
experience according to these views. If one is convinced that reflec-
tion on appearances is misleading, on what basis can one insist
that nevertheless one is bound to be accurate about the presence or
absence of phenonenal properties? If one cannot tell what it really
takes for experience to be one way rather than another, why should
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we think that one can still always tell that some mental presentation
or other must be responsible for things to seem the way that they
are? So the epistemological commitments of Common Kind views
seem to be in tension with the reasons for accepting them. If all
views must concede that some sensory appearances seem other than
they are, then the disjunctivist has the simplest account of how this
can be.
Nonetheless, clearly there is still work to be done to explain why
this stopping off point may seem so incredible to us. That is work
for elsewhere. The aim in this paper has simply been to identify
exactly where that stopping off point should be, and to delimit what
disjunctivism need and need not be committed to.28
NOTES
1 Recent defenders of intentionalism include Harman (1990), Peacocke (1983,
1992), Searle (1983), Tye (1995). In the analytic tradition its popularity can be
traced back to Firth’s discussion of the percept theory in the mid-century (Firth,
1965), on the one hand, and Anscombe’s critique of both sense-datum theorists
and their ordinary language opponents (Anscombe 1962), on the other. With some
caveats, one can also see it as dominant within the phenomenological tradition.
2 To this purpose, the term ‘sense-datum’ was introduced first by Moore in
Moore (1905) and made public in Russell (1912). Though out of favour in recent
years, one can find defences of sense-data in Jackson (1977), O’Shaughnessy
(1980), Foster (1986), and Robinson (1994). Subjectivism as here conceived
captures a broader range of theories than just this, though, and includes for
example the appeal to sensational properties in Peacocke (1983).
3 William Alston has recently defended a theory of appearing while claiming of
hallucinations that we can consider them to be awarenesses of mental images,
see Alston (1999, pp. 191–192). He suggests that nothing positively shows that
mental images are dependent on our awareness of them, and if one could maintain
this conclusion, the argument of the text would be blocked. However he does not
discuss what model of the causation of hallucination we would then need to adopt:
can the local conditions for producing mental images be sensitive to the absence
of an external object of perception? If not, which is the overwhelming plausible
conclusion to draw, then if the veridical perception is the same kind of mental
state, we will get the conclusion drawn in the text.
4 Harold Langsam, who endorses disjunctivism, seeks to block the argument
from hallucination by suggesting that there are possible accounts of hallucination
on which an hallucination is, for example, a relation to the region of physical
space where an object appears to be (Langsam, 1997, p. 47). However, Langsam’s
agnostic stance about the nature of hallucinations is misleading about the force of
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the argument against the Naïve Realist. Of course there may be some hallucina-
tions which are examples of awareness of the mere air around us. But the pressing
question is whether there are any which take the form indicated in the text and
which are of the same kind as veridical perceptions. Langsam does nothing to
show that such experiences are impossible, nor does he discuss the consequences
of the possibility of their existence.
5 Such talk of intentional objects can be traced at least to Anscombe (1962),
who claims Medieval authority for it, and this way of expressing the view is
echoed in Harman (1990). Nonetheless, critics tend to read the talk as involving a
commitment to a special kind of entity, which unsurprisingly leads to a dismissal
of mystery mongering. No such ontological profligacy need be, or was intended
by those who chose to talk in this way.
6 As I propose at greater length in Martin (2001).
7 See in particular Martin (2002).
8 This is true of Moore and Russell, who insisted that the objects of sensing
must be independent of our awareness of them (see Moore, 1922; Russell, 1912;
Broad, 1925; Price, 1932). For an early criticism of precisely this aspect of the
sense-datum tradition (Prichard, 1950).
9 Merleau-Ponty (1942); Valberg (1992).
10 However, Hannah Ginsborg reminded me that Hinton does discuss fact
perception in the later monograph, Experiences, see pp. 101–124; so the contrast
is perhaps not as stark as I present it here.
11 Here I follow the approach to indiscriminability found in Williamson (1990);
see below for further discussion of the relevant properties of indiscriminability.
12 See, Robinson (1985, 1994) and also Foster (1986), but note the recantation
of this in Foster (2000, Pt Two, p. 2). Other recent versions of the argument can
also be found in O’Shaughnessy (1980, Ch. 5) and Valberg (1992).
13 That is to say, ∀e∀s∀s′∀C∀N[[[In(s,e) & In(s,C) & In(s,N) & K(e)] &
[CausCond(C,e,s) & NcausCond(N,e,s)] & [[In(s′,C) & In(s′,N)]] → [∃e′K(e′)
& In(s′,e’)]], taking quantification over the events to have widest scope. (Thanks
to Susanna Siegel for pointing out the need to disambiguate.)
14 Nicholas Nathan in unpublished work has sought to challenge the causal argu-
ment in just this way.
15 Perhaps no one has ever really endorsed such singularism about causation
which would be to suppose that the truth of some singular causal statements had
no implications whatever for general truths about what general circumstances
occur with what other general circumstances, yet Anscombe (1981), is often
credited with such a position.
16 John Foster in his most recent discussion of these matters suggests that the
causal argument can be blocked by claiming that the object of perception acts
as a direct cause in addition to any role it has in producing intermediary causal
steps which can be replicated in the case of hallucination. The principle of ‘Same
Causes, Same Effects’ would therefore not be violated by the Naïve Realist. In
response to the arguments considered here, Foster in addition needs to claim
that the hallucination has a cause which is not replicated in the case of veridical
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perception, and indeed this is what he does, see Foster (2000, p. 41). For all that,
Foster’s suggestion here does just seem to be of the form of double counting,
allowing the absence of a specific causal factor itself to count as a distinctive
causal factor.
17 Just such a worry seems to be moving Scott Sturgeon in Sturgeon (1998, 2000,
Ch. 1).
18 One of the classical discussions of this is Mill’s principle of difference in A
System of Logic, III, viii, 2. For an interesting discussion of the limits of this
strategy of explanation see Gendler (2002).
19 Someone might object that the most determinate property has to explain and
not any of its determinables, but for a convincing exposition of the opposing view
see Yablo (1992, 1997).
20 This is a theme familiar from Evans (1982), and McDowell, see in particular
McDowell (1986). It is not clear whether Evans himself would have endorsed
disjunctivism about perception, unlike McDowell he certainly did not think the
content of perceptual experience object-dependent.
21 See Peacocke (1993) and Williamson (1995, 2000).
22 See Chisholm (1959) and Jackson (1977) for two such discussions.
23 See Williamson (1995, 2000, Ch. 1).
24 Just such worries are expressed by Williamson in Williamson (1995).
25 See Graff (2001).
26 See Williamson (1990).
27 In the version presented at Oberlin, these last few comments were omitted.
The suggestions made here may address some of the concerns that Susanna Siegel
raises in the first part of her paper.
28 This paper originated as a twenty minute talk at CREA in Paris and a written
draft was produced during a visit at the RSSS of the ANU; versions of the paper
have been read to audiences in Paris, Canberra, Dubrovnik, Edinburgh, London,
Leeds, Helsinki and Oberlin. I am grateful in particular for comments on this
material to Tim Crane, Alan Hajek, Jen Hornsby, Véronique Munoz-Dardé, Panu
Raatikainen, Susanna Siegel, Paul Snowdon, Maja Spener, Charles Travis, and
above all to Scott Sturgeon for provoking much of the second half of the paper.
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